nomic eligibility criteria of DI and SSI interact with largely exogenous demographic and economic factors to influence duration.
Programmatic variables also directly affect duration by influencing exits and reentry. Such variables include work incentive provisions, continuing disability reviews, vocational rehabilitation, and various rules concerning suspensions, terminations and return to the rolls. Some of these variables directly affect program eligibility (e.g., Con tinuous Disability Reviews [CDRs] ), while others are expected to affect duration on the rolls through altering behavior (e.g., vocational rehabilitation). All of these variables affect the generosity of the bene fits and therefore may have indirect effects through altering application behavior.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the factors affecting duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls based on previous studies and original research by the authors, and to analyze implica tions for caseload growth, projections, and policies. Several previous studies analyzed duration on the SSI and DI rolls on the basis of micro data from the Social Security Administration's administrative records systems. Most described the experiences of a single annual cohort of awardees using a fixed (e.g., two-or four-year) follow-up window (e.g. , Treitel 1979; Bye, Riley, and Lubitz 1987; Scott 1989; Bye et al. 1991) . Dykacz (1992, 1993) compared two annual cohorts on the basis of a four-year follow-up window. With the single exception of Scott (1989) focusing on SSI disability stays, the above studies analyzed duration on the DI rolls among DI awardees, some of whom may have had concurrent unobserved SSI disability benefit receipt experience. Two studies Rupp and Scott 1995) utilized a much longer follow-up observation period (nine years and ten years, respectively), and used statistical methods to adjust for the lack of complete data on the completion of first DI spells (right censoring) and on first spell and total duration (including multi ple spells) data for the SSI disability program. These are the only two previous studies that presented mean duration statistics that are adjusted for censoring bias. Hennessey and Dykacz (1989) based their estimates on the experience of a single (1972) annual cohort of DI awardees, while Rupp and Scott (1995) utilized a data file containing multiple annual cohorts of SSI disability awardees and based their esti mates of mean duration on the experience of persons first awarded payGrowth in Disability Benefits 141 ments during [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] . They also conducted comparisons of duration patterns in DI, SSI, and Aid to Families with Dependent Chil dren. Other relevant previous studies looked at terminations (Schmulowitz 1973) , analyzed the postrecovery experience of DI beneficiaries , and compared the health and earnings of DI beneficiaries with the experience of rejected disability applicants (Bound 1989) . Treitel (1979) analyzed the outcomes of appeals by ini tial DI denials and presented six-year follow-up data on death rates among rejected applicants. Only one previous study focused on the implications of trends in the composition of disability awardees on duration (Chirikos and Rupp 1992; Chirikos 1993) . The study was based on aggregate data on awardees and a secondary analysis of micro data on duration, but was limited to DI.
AWARDEE CHARACTERISTICS AND DURATION
In this section we describe the effects of key awardee characteristic variables on duration and analyze the effect of the changing mix of awardees along these dimensions on trends in expected duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls. We will focus on the effects of age, gender, and diagnosis.
• Age is expected to affect duration because of its negative effect on the length of exposure to potential program participation, the positive relationship between age and mortality risk, and the neg ative relationship between age and the probability of return to work. The first two factors suggest a negative relationship between age at award and duration, while the third one is expected to affect duration in the opposite direction.
• Gender may affect duration because of the lower mortality risk of females in the general population, although this may be clouded by selectivity in the award process. Also, work-related suspen sions may be affected by gender differences, since men and women differ in work histories and work-related incomes.
• Diagnosis fundamentally affects mortality risk, as well as the nature and severity of functional limitations and work disabilities affecting the opportunity costs of return to work. We will analyze duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls separately due to the current lack of comprehensive event history data for both programs within a unified framework. In the first half of this section we will focus on DI awardees, some of whom received SSI benefits for many years, while others, particularly those applying for both pro grams, received them for a short period of time. According to our pre vious estimates (Rupp and Scott 1995) , approximately 75 percent of awardees applying for both DI and SSI benefits complete their first SSI payment eligibility spell for reasons of excess income, presumably largely as a result of the start of DI payments. We can infer that the bulk of the disability payment experience of these concurrent awardees consists of duration on the DI rolls. Since concurrent awardees are implicitly reflected in the DI duration data, and because of the predom inance of early SSI exits for this group, the second half of this section focuses on nonconcurrent SSI awardees, i.e., persons initially eligible for SSI but not DI payments.
Duration on DI: Characteristics and Trends
There are three principal reasons for the suspension or termination of DI benefits: medical or work-related recovery, death, and retirement (conversion to the old-age component of social security at age 65). Overall, more than half of first DI disability spells end with retirement, more than a third are terminated due to death, and only 11 percent recover. Gender differences are dominated by the lower mortality risk of females. There is a strong negative relationship between age and the probability of recovery (Chart 4.1).
As age at award increases the probability of death increases, but the numbers also indicate that the competing outcome of conversion to the retirement program overtakes as the main reason for termination at the older age groups. Diagnostic differences are also marked, particularly among younger awardees. We note that changes in program rules, to be discussed later in more detail, play an important role in a beneficiary's recovery. In particular, changed work incentives, such as the introduc tion of the extended period of eligibility, changes in the number of 144 Rupp and Scott CDRs, and the introduction of the medical improvement standards might have substantially altered the probability of recovery during the last two decades.
The net effect of age on expected duration is negative (Table 4 .1). While overall expected length of first spells varies substantially by diagnosis-ranging from the low of 3.4 years for neoplasms to the high of 15.6 years for mental disorders, age differences are also important, especially for mental illness and nervous system disorders, where the expected duration of first spells is around 25 years in the youngest age group.
As expected, diagnostic differences are strongest in the youngest group and least pronounced among 50-to 61-year-olds (Chart 4.2). The lengths of stay shown in Table 4 .1 represent the first uninterrupted SOURCE Hennessey and Dykacz (1989, pp. 10, 12 Dykacz and Hennessey (1989) , the authors estimated that accounting for multiple spells may result in an increase in mean dura tion of as little as a 0.4 years, from the 9.3 years average presented in Table 4 .1 to 9.7 years in the aggregate (Rupp and Scott 1995) . Given the obvious importance of age and diagnosis in affecting duration, it is natural to ask whether changes in the mix of awardees along these characteristics through time resulted in marked changes in the expected duration of successive cohorts of DI awardees. The pro portion of younger awardees (aged 34 years or less) has increased from 13.5 percent in 1975 to 19.3 percent in 1993. The data also show some marked shifts in the mix of awardees by diagnosis. The proportion of awardees with a primary diagnosis of mental disorders has increased from 11.5 percent in 1975 to 26.1 percent in 1993, while the proportion of awardees in the circulatory disorders category decreased from about 30 percent in 1975 to 14 percent in 1993.
By combining information on the changing mix of awardees by age with disaggregated data on spell length for subgroups identified by age, it is possible to simulate mean spell length over time. Our estimates reflect the effect of changes in the age mix of new awardees on the expected mean length of first spells. Changes in the age mix of award ees produce a slow upward trend in expected duration from about 9 years in 1960 to about 11 years in 1992; most of the estimated increase occurred since the early 1980s (Chart 4.3).
We did some additional work to see if the addition of diagnostic detail would change the results of the simulation substantially. We tested this hypothesis by conducting an alternative simulation using information on mean duration of first spells by age and diagnosis and data on the joint distribution of awardees by age and diagnosis for 1975 and 1993. The results of the two simulations were virtually identical, suggesting that using age-specific information for the simulation pro duces robust results with respect to diagnosis. This is an important finding with respect to projection methodology highlighting the pri mary importance of the age distribution of new awardees for expected duration. We also compared our results with those of Chirikos (1993) Changes in the age mix of new awardees reflect a variety of forces, including changes in demographics (e.g., aging of the baby boom gen eration), epidemiological trends in the incidence of various disabling conditions with various age distributions of onset, and changes in the Social Security Administration (SSA) regulations (e.g., mental impair ment regulations). Thus the results reflected in Chart 4.3 cannot simply be attributed to demographics alone. In order to better understand the role of demographics in explaining our results, we conducted an analy sis of the effect of changes in the age mix of the Dl-insured population on duration. Changes in the age mix of the Dl-insured population between 1975 and 1993 reflects largely, though not exclusively, the aging of the baby boom generation and therefore are indicative of demographic shifts in the U.S. population. In order to estimate the effect of changes in the age mix of the Dl-insured population, we ana lyzed the effect of year-to-year changes in the age mix of the Dlinsured population on duration, assuming unchanged incidence rates between successive years and using the age-specific duration estimates used in the previous analysis that produced Chart 4.3. In our simulation we updated the incidence rate assumptions annually.
Actuarial data show that the proportion of younger (18 to 34 years old) Dl-insured workers peaked during the early 1980s, while the pro portion of older insured workers declined until fairly recently. Much of the overall decline in the average age of Dl-insured workers between 1975 and 1993 is attributable to an increase in the proportion of mid dle-aged (35 to 49 years old) Dl-insured workers at the expense of older (50 to 61 years old) Dl-insured workers.
Our analysis shows that a substantial portion of the increase in the mean duration of first DI spells we attributed to changes in the age mix of DI awardees can be explained by demographics, but other factors contributed almost as much. We estimate that about half (0.8 years) of the 1975-1993 increase in expected duration (1.4 years) is attributable to changes in the mix of the Dl-insured population. The rest (0.6 years) is attributable to other factors contributing to the lowering of the age at entry among new awardees. For example, if the incidence of awards for conditions with a relatively early onset (e.g., mental retardation and Growth m Disability Benefits 149 psychiatric conditions) disproportionately increases, average age at award may decline, even if no demographic factors are at play.
The data also suggest that the trend of increasing duration of new awardees has magnified the implied effects of the rapid rise in the num ber of new awards during the last decade on eventual caseloads. While the number of DI awards (aged 62 or less) has increased from about 250,000 in 1982 to about 580,000 in 1993, expected duration also increased by about 1 year (about 10 percent). Together, the influx of awardees and the increase in stay length substantially affect caseloads. This effect can be seen by multiplying the two factors (first two col umns in Table 4 .2). Expected benefit years rose from 2.5 million for the 1982 entry cohort to about 6.3 million for the 1993 cohort. The 1982-1993 increase in benefit years was primarily the result of increased awards; the increase in expected duration had a relatively small contribution to the overall change. However, if we take a longer view by looking at changes between 1975 and 1992, the previous and most recent peak in DI awards, duration becomes the key factor; an increase in expected duration from 9.5 to 11 years is a major contribu tor to the increase in simulated benefit years.
Finally, we note that our simulations reflect only the effect of changes in the mix of awardees (by age, and probably diagnosis as well) and do not capture changes affecting mean duration either for selected subgroups or across the board. For example, changes in work incentives, such as the introduction of the extended period of eligibil ity, might have increased mean duration, particularly for younger groups of awardees. In this case, due to such cohort effects, mean expected duration may have increased during recent decades more than our simulations seem to suggest.
Duration on the SSI Disability Rolls
In this section we focus on duration on the SSI disability rolls among nonconcurrent awardees prior to reaching their 65th birthday. In contrast to the discussion of DI, our analysis here also covers chil dren, who form an important, rapidly increasing, and controversial part of the SSI disability program. We will, however, present some informa tion for working-age SSI awardees separately that will be of use in comparisons with DI. The main difference between the DI and SSI dis- 1960 1965 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 ability programs affecting duration is the fact that DI is conditioned on prior work history, while SSI is means-tested. SSI recipients might lose payment eligibility as a result of changes in their family income or assets. It is to be noted, however, that DI beneficiaries are more at a risk of losing payment eligibility for work-related reasons, even after the liberalization of work incentive provisions during the 1980s. The differences in program design between the two programs need to be considered in comparing the SSI results, to be presented below, with the analysis of DI duration. Overall, the SSI means test is the most important reason for first sus pensions during the first ten post-award years (Table 4. 3). Death and reaching age 65 are clearly much less important reasons for first exits than in DI, even accounting for the fact that the eventual first suspen sion of many of the approximately one-quarter of awardees who did not exit during the first ten post-award years will be one of these two categories. The data show marked differences in the reason for first exits by age, diagnosis, and to a lesser extent by gender, generally in directions consistent with the DI findings.
The SSI stays of the 1974-1982 cohorts (Table 4 .4) were corrected for the right-censoring of observations (Rupp and Scott 1995) . Projec tions were made not only for first spells but also for total years expected on the rolls. Not surprisingly, the data show that the mean duration of first spells is substantially lower for working-age SSI awardees when compared to DI awardees. Moreover, subgroup differ ences are less marked in SSI, particularly by age group. These program differences appear to be driven by the effect of the SSI means test on the dynamics of first spells. Early suspensions due to the failure to con tinue to qualify for the means test affects SSI awardees largely inde pendently of age and diagnosis.
When multiple stays are accounted for (Chart 4.4), the overall pic ture dramatically changes, however. Overall, the mean SSI stay almost doubles from 6.9 years for first stays to 13.2 years for all spells for nonconcurrent adults and children combined. This brings the mean SSI stay to a level clearly higher than the mean DI duration, even account ing for the lack of precise data on DI total duration. The difference between the two programs appears largely attributable to the inclusion of children in the SSI disability program, although the data do not allow for a precise comparison. We note that the DI first spell and SSI With duration patterns already described, we need to see how the demographic and diagnostic mix has changed over time. The most dra matic trend is the increasing proportion of children from 12.7 percent of new awardees in 1974 to 40.9 percent in 1993. Changes in the diag nostic mix of new awardees are also substantial, with the proportion with mental retardation and psychiatric conditions increasing dramati cally, from 5 percent to 22 percent (mental retardation) and from 6.8 percent to 31.1 percent (psychiatric conditions) between 1974 and 1993. A long-term decline of the proportion of females among new nonconcurrent SSI awardees from 56.8 percent in 1974 to 47.5 percent in 1993 reflects the increase in the proportion of women in the DIinsured population during this period of time.
Armed with both durations and demographic patterns, we were able to produce simulations that reflect changes in the joint distribution of new awardee cohorts by age, gender, and diagnosis. We also conducted simulations using information on changes in the age distribution alone and on changes in the age-gender mix. These latter, cruder methods, resulted in almost identical results. This robustness suggests that fac tors associated with the age mix of new awardees dominate the results. This is consistent with our findings for DI in this respect.
Changes in the age distribution of new awardees between 1974 and 1993 are responsible for a substantial increase in expected duration from a mean of 12.3 years in 1974 to a mean of 17.8 years in 1993 (Chart 4.5). This is a much more dramatic increase than was observed for DI. However, when children are excluded from the analysis, the trends for DI and SSI nonconcurrent adults appear much more similar. The combined effect of changes in the number of new awardees and the mix of awardees by the demographic variables considered in our analysis can be represented by the simulated benefit years associated with each entry cohort. As previously shown for DI, this is simply the product of the number of new awards and simulated mean total dura tion for each annual cohort of new awards (Table 4 .5).
The combined effect of the dramatic drop of new awards between 1974 and 1982 and the dramatic increase in childhood disability awards with long expected duration during subsequent years produces Year of award a dramatic pattern of changes and contrast between the early 1980s and recent years. The analysis above is limited to the effects of awardee mix on expected duration and does not address the possibility that factors other than age, gender, and diagnosis might have also induced changes in duration on the rolls. Such other factors could include either awardee characteristics other than the three variables considered, or factors (such as programmatic variables) directly affecting duration events. 
PROGRAMMATIC FACTORS DIRECTLY AFFECTING DURATION
In the previous section we have demonstrated that the mix of awardees fundamentally shapes duration on the rolls. Nevertheless, these effects are conditional on programmatic rules concerning exit and reentry events. In this section we will focus on programmatic factors directly affecting duration, including suspensions and terminations for medical-and income-related reasons, work incentive provisions, and vocational rehabilitation.
CDRs form the primary vehicle for removing persons from the DI and SSI disability rolls for medical reasons. The number of CDRs per formed greatly varied over the years subject to swings in political deci sion making and SSA staffing constraints. During the early Reagan years, CDRs were perceived as important tools for containing the growth of the disability rolls. Following a political backlash and numerous court decisions, a moratorium was issued on CDRs during the mid 1980s, followed by the introduction of the medical improve ment standards making the removal of persons from the disability rolls for medical reasons more difficult. At the 1983 peak, 436,000 DI cases were reviewed, comprising 13.5 percent of the caseload (U.S. House of Representatives 1993, p. 64). More than 40 percent (182,000) were removed from the rolls. In contrast, during 1995 only 0.1 percent of the DI caseload was reviewed, and only 15 percent of these (475 cases) were removed from the rolls. Subsequently the number of CDRs per formed increased somewhat. The experience with CDRs in the SSI program also showed great variations, with a minimum level of activity during the last couple of years.
More recently, the role of CDRs as a policy tool has increased again, as exemplified by Section 212 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 concerning SSI childhood dis ability cases, as well as other recent initiatives. Section 201 of P.L. 103-296, the Social Security Independence and Program Improve ments Act of 1994, introduced time-limited benefits for persons dis abled based on a finding that drug addiction or alcoholism was a contributing factor material to the finding of disability. More recently, these provisions were replaced by stricter provisions of P.L. 104-121, the "Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996," providing for the outright termination of cash benefits and health coverage for all DI and SSI disability recipients who received disability benefits based on drug addiction and/or alcoholism at the time of the enactment of the law as of January 1, 1997, and prohibiting future DI and SSI disability benefit allowances (and associated Medicare and/or Medicaid eligibil ity) to any future disability applicant whose drug addiction and/or alco holism would be material to the determination of disability.
CDRs clearly affect duration on the rolls and may affect subsequent applications similar to the effect of denial rates, as was demonstrated by Parsons' work (1991) . In this pioneering study, based on economic theory, Parsons hypothesized that high denial rates discourage subse quent disability applications as a result of their negative effect on the expected net benefits of DI application. His empirical analysis-based on data from the late 1970s-provided results consistent with this hypothesis. CDRs may have negative effects not only on duration among those on the rolls, but also on subsequent DI applications for similar reasons.
However, past experience suggests difficulties with relying on CDRs as a primary strategy of containing caseload growth both because of the legal and political problems embedded in the approach and for sub stantive reasons. Many persons on the disability rolls face serious med ical problems; identifying those whose medical condition sufficiently improves and is likely to improve in the future is inherently difficult. Moreover, time spent on the disability rolls -results in the depreciation of work skills and is expected to result in difficulties in returning to the labor force, especially without assistance. The General Accounting Office study of DI beneficiaries terminated during 1981-84 found that more than half returned to the rolls, and of those who did not, nearly half were not working (quoted in U.S. House of Representatives 1993, p. 70).
Administrative changes related to the SSI means test are also of potential importance in affecting duration. As we discussed previously, the data presented in Table 4 .5 suggest that recent changes in the han dling of failure to respond to an agency request for information had a negative effect on suspensions, and hence a positive effect on length of stay. In general, procedures designed to tighten the monitoring of SSI means-test eligibility are expected to reduce duration, while loosening of procedures and/or reduction in the amount of resources devoted to monitor SSI income or asset eligibility are expected to increase dura tion.
In light of the difficulties of relying on the stick-only approach of CDRs, the interest in the carrots of work incentives is understandable. Both SSI (Section 1619 program) and DI (trial work period and extended period of eligibility) have gone through substantial liberaliza tions. Little is currently known about the effects of these changes on duration. The cohort-based comparison of DI exit rates during the 1970s and 1980s (Hennessey and Dykacz 1993) suggests that the liber alization of DI work incentives during the early 1980s actually increased length of stay. Similarly, with the introduction of Section 1619 provisions SSI suspensions directly resulting from work activities were eliminated, and data presented in Table 4 .6 suggests no secular increase in income-related suspensions either. Thus, it appears that pre vious reforms of work incentive provisions might have increased dura tion in both programs. In addition, as Hoynes and Moffitt (1996) argue, such changes in work incentive provisions may induce additional applications thereby further adding to caseload size.
Vocational rehabilitation (VR) is another positive strategy to reduce duration in the disability rolls. The number of disability beneficiaries served by the state VR system has been historically small and has decreased further since SSA's placement-oriented reimbursement of VR agencies was introduced. Moreover, little is known about the effec tiveness of these interventions because of the difficulty in establishing a useful control group. The interest in vocational rehabilitation demon strations is rooted in the perceived failure of work incentives to move sizable numbers of beneficiaries to productive employment in an effi cient manner. Six-year experimental follow-up results from the Transi tional Employment Training Demonstration (Decker and Thornton 1995) indicate that the employment services raised the average employment and earnings levels of the mentally retarded SSI recipients who were offered transitional employment services, and that the increases persisted relatively undiminished during the six-year period. However, the modest reduction in SSI payments offset only a fraction of the cost of transitional employment services. Moreover, only a small subset of eligible SSI recipients volunteered for the demonstration. A more recent SSA demonstration initiative, Project NetWork, targets a much broader group, including all DI beneficiaries and SSI recipients in the demonstration areas and uses a case-management approach to return-to-work (Rupp, Bell, and McManus 1994) . The net impact results of this large-scale experimental evaluation are not available yet, but preliminary analyses of demonstration participation suggest thatsimilar to the Transitional Employment and Training Demonstrationonly a fraction of project eligibles volunteered for the demonstration (Rupp, Wood, and Bell 1996) . In view of the increases in the size of the caseload, policymakers continue to have an interest in these more direct methods of limiting duration on the rolls as evidenced by SSA's evolving employment strategy and the recent review of the disability program by the National Academy of Social Insurance (Mashaw et al. 1996) . Whether such ini tiatives are going to have substantial effects on duration in the desired direction (reduction) is too early even to speculate on. Nevertheless, while much more research needs to be done on the effects of CDRs, work incentives, vocational rehabilitation, and other programmatic variables on duration, it appears safe to infer that none of these factors had a large overall effect on containing caseload growth over the last decade. If anything, the most consequential recent changes probably had effects in the opposite direction. By all likelihood the medical improvement standards, changes in the mental regulations, and the Zebley decision contributed to increased expected duration. Thus, the results of our simulations concerning expected length of stay in the previous section are likely to provide a conservative view of past trends in expected duration.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE DURATION AND CASELOADS
In our analysis so far we have focused on past trends in awardee characteristics and expected duration. These factors do affect the future by virtue of the fact that the potential exposure to program participa tion of new awardees, especially among those young at first entry, is extremely long. Thus, as we have demonstrated, and assuming no major changes in program rules, the past trend toward younger entrants in both DI and SSI, most notably evidenced by the recent influx of a large number of children to the SSI disability rolls, is expected to put a strong upward pressure on caseloads for many years to come, unless a large number of the recent entrants are removed from the rolls through new policy initiatives. This implication of past trends for future case loads will affect SSA's disability programs even if the past trends toward younger entrants were to be reversed in the future.
This section addresses the next logical question. What can we say about the expected duration of future cohorts of new entrants? Can we assume that the past trends toward younger entrants and increasing expected duration will continue in the future? Or perhaps we should expect the reversal of these trends and shorter duration for future entrants? What are the expected effects of such future trends in dura tion on caseloads?
There are a large number of potential factors that might affect the duration of future entry cohorts, from demographic and economic fac tors to future policy and procedural changes. The purpose of this sec tion is not to provide crystal ball speculations about the net effect of all of these diverse forces, but rather to spell out the implications of some relatively tangible factors, notably demographic trends.
While we did not attempt to project future changes in age-specific incidence rates, we have used actuarial projections of the age distribu tion of the Dl-insured population to assess the likely future effects of the aging of the baby boom generation on expected future mean dura tion.
Our analysis shows that this factor alone is likely to result in a oneyear decline in expected duration of first spells between 1993 (see Table 4 .2) and 2006 (Chart 4.6) . While this appears as good news, the same demographic forces also seem to imply future increases in inci dence rates.
The net effect may be an upward demographic pressure on case loads during the next ten to fifteen years as suggested by the relation ship between age, DI incidence rates, and duration in a cross-sectional framework (Table 4 .7). The two factors (incidence and expected dura tion) work in the opposite direction: as age increases the incidence of disabling conditions serious enough to warrant the award of DI disabil ity benefits increases, while expected duration decreases. The product of these two factors represents the net effect on caseloads: expected DI SOURCE Incidence rates were calculated by the authors based on data on the number of DIinsured workers (1993) provided by SSA's Office of the Actuary and the number of 1993 awards by age group. Estimated first-spell duration data by age group are based on estimated by Hennessey and benefit years increase as we move toward the older cohorts of new entrants, because the positive effect of age on incidence rates is stron ger than the negative effect on duration.
We do not have actuarial projections for the population financially eligible for SSL Nevertheless, the population satisfying the SSI means test is conceptually akin to the notion of the Dl-insured population. While the SSI financial eligibility criteria are much more complex than the concept of the Dl-insured status, a microsimulation model devel oped by analysts at the Social Security Administration (Wixon and Vaughan 1989; Vaughan and Wixon 1989 ) based on the rich income and asset information available from the SIPP provides an opportunity for some analysis. Table 4 .8 provides an estimate of the size and agedistribution of the population economically eligible for SSI. The esti mate, provided by Denton Vaughan to the authors, suggests that approximately 25.7 million persons aged 18-64 were financially eligi ble for SSI disability benefits in 1984. These estimates include (but do not identify) persons concurrently satisfying the economic eligibility criteria of both programs, as well as working-age persons eligible for SSI only. Our analysis shows that overall, the relationship between age, incidence, and expected duration of benefits is similar in the two pro grams. Nevertheless, there are some notable differences.
First of all, the SSI incidence rate is higher than the DI incidence rate. The comparison is affected by the exclusion of concurrents from Vaughan and Wixon 1991) . The SIPP estimates reflect the estimated number of persons satisfying the SSI income and assets means test, irrespective of eligi bility for DI The number of SSI awards estimated from the author's 1-percent SSI study file, however, is limited to persons receiving SSI benefits only, at least dunng the initial year following first award. Total duration estimates reflect all SSI disability spells and are based on age-specific means our SSI incidence rate numerator and by the fact that the SSI incidence rates reflect the 1984 experience, while the DI incidence rates reflect 1993 data. However, considering both of these factors would strengthen, rather than weaken the contrast. An important issue for future research is the reason for the higher SSI incidence rate. There are at least three competing hypotheses that might contribute to this finding. First, the average health and disability status of the financially eligible SSI population might be relatively low. Second, SSI benefits are more attractive relative to alternative sources of income for the SSI financially eligible population than the DI benefits are relative to the wages of Dl-insured workers. Third, because of differences in human capital and the lack of work experience, financially eligible SSI appli cants might have an easier time of qualifying under SSA's vocational criteria than might be the case with the average DI applicant. One fac tor that might work in the opposite direction is that a substantial por-tion of the financially eligible SSI population may meet the means test only marginally, and therefore face only relatively low levels of expected SSI payments reducing the economic incentive to apply. When both cash and noncash benefits are considered, however, the net incentives to apply for SSI may be very strong even for financially eli gible persons qualifying only for a small amount of SSI cash benefits because of the importance of Medicaid for many SSI applicants. Table 4 .8 shows that the relationship between age and expected ben efit years is somewhat different for SSI when compared to DI. In par ticular, the increase between the two younger age groups is reversed as age increases. The implication of this finding for the projection of the future effects of demographics on caseloads is that the aging of the baby boom generation might have a smaller net effect on SSI caseloads when compared to DI. However, because of the complex relationships between age, poverty status, family structures, disabilities, and other factors affecting the size of the SSI financially eligible population and incidence rates, much more work needs to be done before firm conclu sions can be reached about trends in future awards, duration, and case loads in the SSI disability program.
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we assessed the relationship between age, gender, diagnosis, and duration on the DI and SSI disability rolls, and quanti fied the implications of past trends in awardee characteristics and future caseloads. We also looked at programmatic factors directly affecting duration, and the combined effect of incidence rates and expected duration on age-specific expected benefit years. We also made some inferences about the likely effects of the aging of the baby boom generation on expected duration and caseloads.
The data show that lifetime duration in both the DI and SSI disabil ity programs is long; thus long duration is an important determinant of caseloads, and hence of program cost. Between 1975 and 1993 the shift toward younger entrants resulted in substantial increases in the expected duration of new awardees in both DI and SSI. These past trends in expected duration create an upward pressure on future case-172 Rupp and Scott loads, especially in SSI where the recent influx of children is expected to have substantial future effects on caseloads, under the assumption that current program rules will stay in effect for persons already on the rolls in the future. An important issue for future research concerns the effects of Section 211 of the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 envisioning substantial tightening of SSI childhood disability eligibility provisions.
Our analysis suggests that the aging of the baby boom generation contributed to the 1975-1993 increase in the expected average duration of successive cohorts of new DI entrants, but that these trends will reverse during the 1993-2006 period as the baby boom generation ages. This will moderate, but not entirely eliminate, the likely upward pressures of the aging of the baby boom generation on future caseloads arising from rising incidence rates.
Our analysis suggests the usefulness of cohort-based studies of duration for understanding and quantifying the factors affecting future terminations and caseloads. In particular, such a perspective seems use ful in disentangling the effects of awardee characteristics, the size of successive awardee cohorts, programmatic variables and other factors. Several important issues remain for future research. We need to learn much more about the interaction of the SSI and DI programs as they affect the duration of disability benefits and future caseloads, and par ticularly about the duration experience of concurrent awardees. Much more work needs to be done, and is feasible to do, concerning trends in SSI financial eligibility and their effect on duration and caseloads. Finally, there is a clear need for creative and rigorous work on the likely consequences of various strategies to contain the growth of the disability rolls through affecting entry and exit events.
Mont earnings, more awards to older applicants will generally mean higher average monthly checks. As shown in Table 1 (using demographic and program data reported in Rupp's and Scott's paper), the age distribu tion of awards in 2005 should be much higher than in 1993, the most recent year reported in the paper. Furthermore, older awardees get sig nificantly larger monthly checks; as shown in Table 1 , the difference can be hundreds of dollars per month. Therefore, the impact of aging baby boomers on the disability trust fund will be larger than their impact on caseloads. 
